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Abstract∗1
The acne drug Accutane lies at the center of a movement to expand post-approval controls
on drug regulation in an eﬀort to eﬀectively manage drug risks. Accutane’s regulatory history
tracks a trend towards the increasing emphasis in drug regulatory policy on post-marketing
risk management. The Accutane experience illustrates the fundamental regulatory problems
of drug safety, drug availability and individual autonomy driving this shift. Recent reform of
Accutane regulation through the S.M.A.R.T. program both exempliﬁes the trend and suggests
its limitations.
I. Introduction
“As an individual practitioner, it was my decision that this patient be treated with Accutane, and
it should remain my decision and not that of the manufacturer the pharmacist, or anyone else.”2
1∗ I would like to thank Mr. Peter Barton Hutt for his encouragement and advice during the preparation of this paper.
1“The FDA has to regulate drugs in the real world. In this world doctors are imperfect...People
are not always straightforward about their sexual activity. Women with acne come into oﬃces
demanding treatment...One of the world’s most potent teratogens cannot be left to ride on all
these waves of chance.”3
This paper explores the story of Accutane, or Isotretinoin, a drug approved in 1982 for the treatment of
severe recalcitrant cystic acne.4 Its regulatory history, and the debate captured by the quotations above,
tracks the larger story of American drug regulatory policy and its increasing emphasis on post-approval drug
regulation.
Accutane’s story is inextricably intertwined with that of another drug– thalidomide. Thalidomide was widely
used in Europe in the 1960s as a morning sickness remedy and a sleeping pill.5 However, much like Accu-
tane, the drug also caused severe deformities in thousands of babies.6 In the United States, Thalidomide
was distributed to doctors for purposes of investigation, but it was never mass marketed. A Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) medical oﬃcer, Dr. Frances O. Kelsey, had rejected the drug for non-compliance
with the safety requirements of the Federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“1938 Act”).7
The 1938 Act was passed in the wake of an earlier drug-related tragedy; In 1937, “Elixir Sulfonilamide” killed
at least 70 people when it was widely marketed with neither animal not human safety testing.8. The tragedy
placed into sharp relief the inadequacies of the then prevailing regulatory system structured by the Food
and Drug Act of 1906 (“1906 Act”).9 The 1906 Act required that drugs purity and strength standards to
prevent misbranding and adulteration.10 Yet it provided no safety or eﬃcacy standards and prosecution un-
der the Act was virtually impossible.11 The Act oﬀered no preventive remedies, but provided manufacturers
4Joan H. Krause, Accutane: Has Drug Regulation in he United States Reached its Limits?, 6 J.L. and Health 7 (1991-92)
5Id. at 4
6Id.
7Id.
8Hutt, Peter Barton & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 476 (1991)
9Krause, supra note 3, at 4.
10Id.
11Id.
2numerous loopholes.12 In addition, its interpretation in the courts substantially limited its eﬀectiveness.13
To remedy the situation, Congress passed the 1938 Act.14 In accordance with its provisions, manufacturers
must provide evidence of their drug’s safety.15 The 1938 Act also made prosecution more feasible by elimi-
nating the 1906 Act’s intent requirement in misbranding cases.16 Factory inspections were authorized as a
preventative measure under the Act, injunctive relief became available and cosmetics and food were brought
under federal regulation.17 Nevertheless, proof of a drug’s eﬀectiveness was still not required under the 1938
Act.18
The Thalidomide tragedy prompted Congressional amendments.19 In 1962, Congress required by a unani-
mous vote that products meet both safety and eﬃcacy standards.20 The Amendments established detailed
drug approval procedures, including the animal and human clinical trials performed today.21
Twenty years later, with this system largely intact, the United States became the ﬁrst country to approve
Accutane for the treatment of severe recalcitrant acne.22 Like Thalidomide, Accutane causes debilitating
birth defects.23 Even minimal exposure to during pregnancy produces at least a 25 percent chance of having
a baby with severe birth defects.24 Such problems include mental retardation, lethal heart defects, and
malformed faces lacking ears or featuring ears below the chins.25 An additional 40 percent of fetuses are
spontaneously aborted.26
12Id.
13Id.
14Id. at 4-5
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id.
19Id.
20Id.
21Id.
22Id. at 7
23Gina Kolata, Europeans Place Stiﬀer Curbs on Acne Drugs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A1.
24Id.
25Id.
26Id.
3The severity of these teratogenic risks are frequently compared to those of Thalidomide, which often produced
babies of normal intelligence, but with ﬂipper like limbs.27 Yet in Accutane’s case, it was the U.S. rather
than Europe that ﬁrst approved the drug for mass marketing.28 Once approved in Europe, Accutane was
usually subjected to far stricter restrictions on its distribution.29 England and Spain carefully monitored
Accutane patients and limited prescribing power to selected specialists.30 In Britain, a woman needed to
ﬁrst visit her own doctor and receive a referral to one of these dermatologists.31 She would only receive the
drug after receiving warnings, signing an informed consent form, and agree to abort any pregnancy conceived
during therapy.32 The United States generally rejected strict post-marketing regulation while emphasizing
pre-approval safety testing.33
Yet during the 1980s, critics of FDA often portrayed American drug regulatory policy as overly cautious;
exacting pre-approval investigation seemed to deprive Americans of valuable drugs available overseas.34
Accutane’s relatively rapid approval and unrestricted post-marketing distribution conﬂicted with the critics’
image of FDA’s “drug lag.”35 However, Accutane’s prompt release was perhaps a harbinger of the speedier
drug approval schemes produced by subsequent revisions of regulatory policy in the 1990s; the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (“PDUFA”) and the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 have since
accelerated access to new drugs.36
Today Accutane lies at the center of a backlash against this accelerated process. Recent revisions of Accutane
regulation through the System to Manage Accutane Related Teratogenicity, (“S.M.A.R.T”), reﬂect worries
27Id.
28Id.
29Id.
30Id.
31Id.
32Id.
33See Harvey Teﬀ, Drug Approval in England and the United States, Am. J. Comp. L. 567, 579 (1985).
34Kolata, supra note 22
35Id.
36See Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, Cath. U. L.
Rev. 449, 462 (2000)
4that faster review and relatively lax post-marketing controls endanger society.37 Allegations that Accutane
may also cause depression and suicide have only intensiﬁed these concerns.38
In Part II of this paper, I examine the recent debate over FDA risk management strategies and analyze a
general shift in American drug regulatory policy towards post-marketing controls. In Part III, I trace the
regulatory history of Accutane, from its rapid approval in 1982 to the S.M.A.R.T program’s imposition of
stricter post-marketing regulation in 2002. Although Accutane did not instantly prompt the sudden sweeping
reform sparked by Thalidomide, its unique regulatory history departs dramatically from traditional drug
regulation.
Reasons for this departure lie in the core tensions at work in American drug regulation policy. Part IV
explores the role that fundamental regulatory dilemmas have played in Accutane’s story. A tradeoﬀ between
safety and availability often underlie regulatory decisions. For Accutane, post-marketing controls may ensure
fewer pregnancy exposures and adverse psychiatric events. Yet they also threaten to limit the drug’s avail-
ability and to fuel a dangerously unregulated underground market. Also shaping the Accutane debate have
been competing conceptions of acne and birth defects. At one extreme, the debate risks trivializing acne as
a uniformly superﬁcial annoyance, rather than recognizing its potentially devastating social and emotional
consequences. At the other extreme, it risks minimizing the suﬀering of those born with Accutane–related
birth defects. Ironically, the very severity of their disabilities may make Accutane’s victims “too easily hid-
den from public view” and their problems too easily overlooked.39 Unlike Thalidomide victims, Accutane
37See Diane Knich, New Restrictions on Acne Drug Aim to Curb Birth Defects, Bos. Globe, Apr. 11, 2002
38See generally Accutane—Is this Acne Drug Treatment Linked to Depression and Suicide?: Before the House Committee
on Government Reform, 106th Congress (2000) [hereinafter House Hearings]; See also Katherine Hobson, Mind versus Face,
U.S. News & World Report, Apr. 1, 2002.
39See Krause supra note 3 at 28.
5victims are usually so disabled that they cannot testify to the hardships they face.40 Issues of individual
choice, maternal responsibility and physician autonomy further complicate the debate as Accutane regula-
tion struggles to balance the welfare of the unborn fetus with the freedom of patients and doctors.41
The Accutane experience reﬂects broader risk management dilemmas. In Part I, I explore a signiﬁcant shift
in American drug regulatory philosophy exempliﬁed by the Accutane experience.
II. Overview of FDA Risk Management Policy
A. Introduction to the Task Force on Risk Management
By May 1999, growing criticism of FDA prompted FDA Commissioner Dr. Jane Henney to commission a
Task Force on Risk Management.42 The Task Force responded to critics with a report entitled Managing
the Risks from Medical Product Use–Creating a Risks Management Framework.43 Critics had alleged that
speedier review of New Drug Applications (“NDAs”) had resulted in more unexpected adverse drug reactions
(“ADRs”).44 They also suggested that FDA’s post-approval surveillance mechanisms inadequately monitored
these ADRs.45 These charges contrasted sharply with critics’ a longstanding concerns about FDA alleged
“drug lag.”46 In the 1980s and early 1990s, critics considered the approval process too lengthy and the delay
40See id.
41See id., at 28.
42Managing the Risks From Medical Product Use—Creating a Risk Management Framework: Report to the FDA Commis-
sioner from the Task Force on Risk Management 17 (May 1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/riskmanagment.pdf
(last visited Apr. 28, 2002) [herinafter Report]
43Id.
44Id.
45See Denise Grady, Need is Seen for a Drug Safety Board, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1998, at F7; Gina Kolata, The F.D.A.
Approves a Drug. Then What?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1997 at F1.
46See Report, supra note 41, at 16.
6with which AIDS and cancer patients received new therapies too extensive.47 Yet by the late 1990s there
were calls for the retrenchment of expedited review procedures.48
B. Overview of Traditional Drug Approval Process
Traditionally, FDA has required that manufacturers seeking new drug approval test their product in lab-
oratory animals.49 Animal testing reveals information on the drug’s toxicity, its absorption in the body
and safe dosage.50 After completion of animal testing, the drug’s sponsor submits its research to FDA and
proposes testing on human subjects.51 This proposal describes the contemplated research in the form of an
“investigational new drug application” or IND.52 Controlled testing in humans can only begin once FDA
determines that such testing can safely be conducted with human volunteers.53
If FDA makes such a determination, then the drug’s sponsor may commence human trials.54 These tests
usually contain three phases.55 Phase I focuses on the drug’s safety.56 Over several months, fewer than 100
healthy, paid volunteers usually take the drug to determine its safety.57 Phase II trials begin if the drug
passes the Phase I tests.58 In Phase II, researchers examine the drug’s eﬀectiveness in treating the ailments
it is designed to combat.59 Several hundred patients with the particular disease that the drug targets are
47Id.
48Grady, supra note 44
49See Krause, supra note 3, at 5.
50Id.
51Id.
52Id.
53Id.
54Id.
55Id.
56Id.
57Id.
58Id.
59Id.
7usually involved.60 Phase II studies usually last for several months to two years and are randomized control
trials; a “treatment” group receives the drug while a control group receiving either a placebo or the standard
treatment is established for comparison.61 In “blinded” Phase II studies, the patient’s group is concealed
from both the patient and the doctor delivering the drug.62 Finally, Phase III approximates normal medical
usage of the drug; several thousand patients with the particular condition may take the drug in an attempt
to reveal a drug’s rarer side aﬀects.63
Phase III may last for four years or more.64 The sponsor ﬁles a “New Drug Application,” or NDA, with FDA
upon completion of Phase III. FDA’s approval of the drug hinges on proof of its safety and the development
of appropriate labeling for the drug.65 Labels must state the drug’s approved indications, its recommended
dosage, contraindications, side eﬀects and warnings.66 This information usually appears on “package inserts”
accompanying the drug.67 Sometimes, however, patients and doctors receive labels developed especially for
their respective needs.68
In particular cases, patients had received investigational new drugs, (“INDs) after FDA had issued ad hoc
“Treatment INDs” or “Compassionate INDs.” In 1987, the FDA’s oﬃcial IND policy was revised so that
patients with immediately life-threatening illnesses could receive experimental drugs without enrolling in
a research trial.69 Under the revised policy, drugs for immediately life-threatening diseases could receive
approval after Phase II trials.70 Similarly, drugs for serious illnesses could receive approval during Phase
III.71 In 1988 FDA, further increased the availability of new drugs by proposing a “fast-track” approval
60Id.
61Id.
62Id.
63Id.
64Id.
65Id.
66Id.
67Id.
68Id.
69Id.
70Id.
71Id.
8program for drugs treating life-threatening or severely debilitating illnesses.72 This program provided for
more lenient FDA risk-beneﬁt analysis of the drugs and entailed greater collaboration between FDA and the
sponsor in developing Phase II clinical trials.73
In 1992, steps to accelerate access to new drugs continued. FDA regulations relaxed scientiﬁc evidence re-
quirements for drugs used to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses “that provide meaningful therapeutic
beneﬁt patients over existing treatment.”74 To qualify for expedited review under this regulation, sponsors
must conduct post-approval studies of the drug.75 Congressional passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee
Act of 1992 (PDUFA) also accelerated the process.76 Pursuant to PDUFA the sponsors of new drug and
biological products provide FDA with user fees to support the review of new pharmacological products.77
The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) reauthorized PDUFA and relaxed the “substantial
evidence” standard so that NDA sponsors need only submit one rather two controlled clinical trials.78
C. Criticism of Expedited Review
Critics of FDA questioned the wisdom of the resulting expedited review.79 A prominent opponent of the
reforms was Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, directed by Dr. Sidney Wolfe and founded by con-
sumer advocate Ralph Nader in 1971.80 In a press conference, the advocacy group reported the results of
its anonymous survey of FDA medical oﬃcers, agency employees assigned to oversee drug evaluations.81
72Id.
73Id. at 6
74See Noah, supra note 35, at 462-463
75See id.
76See Report, supra note 41, at 17.
77See id.
78See id. at 16
79See Denise Grady, In a Survey, the F.D.A. is Accused of Hasty Approval of Drugs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1998, at A1.
80See id.
81See id.
9Nineteen medical oﬃcers stated that 27 drugs were approved over their objections, seventeen considered
FDA’s safety and eﬃciency standards lower than they had been in the past and nineteen reported feeling
more pressured by Congress, the pharmaceutical industry and FDA to approve drugs for mass marketing.82
Public Citizen alleged that pressures to accelerate dug approval had threatened public safety.83
Complaints had intensiﬁed as several FDA approved drugs were withdrawn from the market upon discovery
of previously unforeseen side aﬀects or dangerous interaction with other drugs.84 Among these drugs were
the diet drug Redux, the high blood pressure medication Posicor, and the allergy drug Seldane.85
Drs. Raymond Woosley, Alastair J.J. Wood and Michael Stein have likened these drug recalls to airplane
crashes.86 Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, they called for the establishment of an indepen-
dent safety review board to investigate drug ‘crashes’ much as the transportation board investigates plane
crashes.87 The Doctors contended that if the same organization that approves plane manufacturers and
airlines should not investigate disasters involving those planes and manufacturers, then the same entity that
approves drugs should not be the sole investigator of the drug’s post-approval reactions.88 The doctors noted
that since accelerating its approval process FDA had approved drugs at almost twice its previous rate.89
For them, this acceleration strains an inherently limited drug regulatory system; pre-approval clinical inves-
tigators, of relatively short duration and involving a relatively small number of subjects from a relatively
narrow sample of subjects, may not reveal all drug risks.90 The doctors also deemed FDA’s post-approval
surveillance mechanisms too informal to promptly detect these risks and are feared that the already impaired
system would suﬀer further strain as more drugs enter the market annually.91 Post-marketing, drugs become
82See id.
83See Report, supra note 41, at 17.
84See Noah, supra note 35, at 491
85See id, at 491; See Grady; supra note 44.
86Grady, supra note 44.
87See id.
88See id.
89See id.
90See id.; see also Noah, supra note 35, at 458-462.
91See Grady, supra note 44.
10widely available to a diverse set of patients who may take the drug in combination with other prescriptions.92
Thus, some adverse reactions may ﬁrst surface outside of this controlled environment.93 Dr. Woosley char-
acterized these post-approval patients as unwitting subjects in a massive experiment and argued that such
an experiment needs more careful monitoring.94
Holders of an NDA are required by the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to report any data relating to clinical
experiences with drug.95 However, FDA regulations do not require holders of an approved NDA to actively
seek such information.96 When a health care professional or consumer spontaneously reports an adverse re-
action, the manufacturer must submit an adverse experience report.97 Noah argues that this “ ‘mandatory’
system is only as eﬀective as the degree of voluntary participation permit.”98
Although health care providers are not legally mandated to report adverse drug reactions, they are ethically
obliged to do so.99 In its ﬁrst concerted eﬀort to formally involve physicians in post-marketing surveillance,
FDA established the MedWatch system in 1993.100 Physicians receive one page forms and are asked to
complete them in order to report all serious adverse reactions.101 Included in the events physicians are asked
to report are death, disability, birth defects and miscarriage.102
Barbara A. Noah considers the quality and eﬀectiveness of physician participation in the program “moder-
ately favorable.”103 Nevertheless, she notes that while the quality of the reports has improved, the overall
number of reports has declined since the MedWatch launch. Spontaneous reporting of ADRs peaks at the
end of a second year of the drug’s marketing, but declines dramatically thereafter, regardless of presumably
92See id.
93See id.
94See id.
95See Noah, supra note 35, at 466.
96See id.
97See id., at 469.
98See id.
99See id., at 477.
100See id. at 478.
101See id.
102See id.
103See id.
11constant rates of prescriptions and ADRs.104
Noah suggests, that increasingly common managed care organizations may foster the routine collection and
reporting of ADRs because they can gather and analyze masses of data.105 Yet other features of managed
care plans may oﬀset this advantage.106 Patients change physicians far more often under managed care, im-
peding communication with doctors.107 Communication is also hampered by pressure to reduce the duration
of each patient visit.108 As lines of communication erode, the risks to monitor multiply; under managed care
doctors prescribe more pharmaceuticals to manage chronic disease.109
Indeed, by one 1998 report, only a fraction of doctors can even recognize the forms FDA provides to report
adverse events.110 Doctors and other health care workers may often be unaware that they are expected to
detect and report serious medication side aﬀects.111 Thus some doctors and scientists have called for more
formal, possibly mandatory, involvement of health care workers in the surveillance process.112
D. The Task Force Defense of Pre-Approval Procedures
The Task Force’s Report acknowledged the growing complexity of the health care environment and proposed
changes to meet its demands.113 Healthcare is no longer “provided by a family practitioner who treated pa-
tients from cradle to grave,” the Report notes.114 The Report reﬂects a growing emphasis on post-marketing
104See id.
105See id., at 480.
106See id. at 479
107See id. at 479-480.
108See id. at 479.
109See id. at 479.
110See Kolata, supra note 44.
111See id.
112See id.
113See generally, Report, supra note 41, at 20.
114See id.
12risk management strategies, a trend away from disproportionate reliance on pre-approval testing.115
Nevertheless. the Task Force defended the quality of FDA’s pre-market approval process.116 FDA’s data
showed no increase in the rate of drug withdrawals since PDUFA. It also found no evidence that drugs
approved since PDUFA caused higher rates of serious adverse events on the market.117 Rates of serious
adverse events identiﬁed post-marketing were lower for drugs approved under PDUFA.118 The Task Force
also criticized Public Citizen’s survey method; the group failed to collect information on how frequently or
when medical oﬃcers’ recommendations to disapprove a product were not followed–facts relevant in assessing
the true extent of the problems they alleged.119
Yet the Task Force recommended improvements to FDA’s quality control system, including periodic re-
view of a sample of product approval administrative records, procedures for the continuation of review
despite administrative disruptions and evaluation of whether scientiﬁc disputes among reviewers predicts
post-marketing problems.120 The Task Force also recommended ongoing professional education and core
competency training for reviewers, the completion and updating of Good Review Practice (“GRP”) docu-
ments and the analysis of and incorporation into GRP documents of post-marketing events.121 Additionally,
the task force proposed possible expansion of community based trial centers and the concentration of early
post-approval use in certain populations for whom new product would be especially advantageous.122 Overall
however, the task force found that the key elements of FDA’s quality control system were intact.123
115See generally Report, supra note 41, at 63-70.
116See id. at 35-42.
117See id. at 35.
118See id.
119See id. at 18.
120See id. at 49-50.
121See id.
122See id.
123See id.
13E. Post-Marketing Surveillance Reform
The Report acknowledged the need for greater reform of FDA’s post-marketing surveillance124. The Task
Force noted the increasingly challenging environment in which post-marketing monitoring occurs, painting
a portrait of the current health care climate similar to that of FDA’s critics.125 This account included fre-
quent doctor changes, shorter patient visits and the pressure to prescribe items approved by managed care
plans.126 Yet unlike its critics, the Report shifted emphasis from the post-market monitoring of unexpected
adverse reactions, to surveillance of expected adverse reactions.127 Many of the most highly publicized drug
withdrawals involved the product’s unanticipated side eﬀects.128 Seldane and Redux, for example, were
withdrawn from the market upon discovery of unforeseen drug interactions and side aﬀects respectively.129
FDA, however, reported that its post-marketing monitoring system was performing to accomplish the pur-
poses for which it was designed—“to detect adverse events not previously observed.”130 Nevertheless Dr.
Jane Henney has stressed that most injuries and deaths caused by medical products result from their ex-
pected results.131 For example, Accutane’s risk of birth defects are well known; post-marketing monitoring
of Accutane would monitor the extent of a known problem.
The Report suggests that FDA could assume a more proactive risk management role post-marketing, depart-
ing from its traditionally passive post-marketing activity.132 It reports, “[t]he management of risks associated
with using medical products, known as the practice of medicine, has traditionally been left in the hands of
124See id. at 52.
125See id. at 51.
126See id. at 53.
127See id. at 51
128See Noah, supra note 35, at 486, 492.
129See id.
130See Report, supra note 41, at 52
131Jane E. Henney, M.D., Remarks of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 55 Food Drug L.J. 1, 1 (2000); See Report,
supra note 41, at 12
132See Report, supra note 41, at 92
14health professionals.”133 Although the Report acknowledges that the medical community has resisted FDA’s
restrictions on its practices, it argues that the medical community has increasingly accepted post-approval
FDA regulation.134 Among the possible reforms, the Report suggests that FDA could impose restrictions on
product distributions, impose safety programs for risky products—including mandatory education programs
for prescribers and patients, mandatory re-labeling or re-approval of products—and restrict drugs to certain
uses or prescriber categories.135 The Report noted that such eﬀorts would be particularly appropriate for
drugs with especially high risks.136
The Report also suggested improvement to FDA’s risk communication strategies.137 Although FDA is al-
ready actively engaged in the risk communication process, the Report suggests that these activities would be
more successful within a systematic strategy.138 For example, FDA could categorize the types and severity of
risks and base their communication strategy on these classiﬁcations.139 The Report proposed a Government
sponsored database that health care professionals could access.140 As an example of the information suit-
able for such a database, the Report lists “registry information on the outcomes of the use of drugs during
pregnancy.”141
F. A Comparative Perspective
133See id..
134See id..
135See generally Id. at 92-94.
136See id at 92.
137See id. at 93-96.
138See id. at 93.
139See id.
140See id.
141See id. at 94.
15These proposals reﬂect a shift in U.S. regulatory philosophy towards the British model.142 Harvey Teﬀ, in
his comparative study of drug approval in England and in the United States, characterizes U.S. and British
regulatory philosophy as fundamentally diﬀerent.143 According to Teﬀ, the U.S. drug approval process places
more emphasis on ensuring drug safety prior to the product’s marketing than does its British counterpart.144
By contrast, the British system has traditionally stressed post-marketing risk management strategies.145
In part, Teﬀ attributes this diﬀerence to British regulators’ more explicit acknowledgement “of the unpalat-
able truth that the research process continues even after a licenses drug has been made available for general
prescription.”146 Even with demanding pre-marketing testing, rare side eﬀects will often only appear once a
far greater portion of the population uses the drug post-approval.147 In the U.K., it is far more common for
certain drugs only to be prescribed by hospitals or by certain medical specialists148. Accutane is subject to
such limitations in the U.K.149 There has also been far more attention paid to the post-marketing monitor-
ing of adverse events in the U.K. than in the U.S.150 By contrast, FDA begins its supervision of the drug’s
testing earlier in the regulatory process.151
Underlying these diﬀerent approaches are the political and social climates in which American and British
regulators work.152 Britain is relatively small, has a more homogenous population and has a national
142See Teﬀ, supra note 32, at 579.
143See id.
144See id.
145See id.
146See id.
147See id.
148See id.
149See Kolata, supra note 22; See also 1988 Hearing, supra note 2, at 139 (testimony of Dr. Lynn Silver)
150See Teﬀ, supra note 32, at 579.
151See id.
152See id.
16health care system equipped to gather and study masses of data.153 These factors make more feasible post-
marketing controls and monitoring.154 In addition, Teﬀ argues that the American political system demands
more formal accountability of its regulators; Congressional oversight, media scrutiny and an active consumer
lobby pressure FDA to achieve maximum safety prior to mass marketing.155 In the U.K., a tradition of
administrative secrecy has relieved some of this pressure.156
G. FDA Sub-Committee on Drug Safety and Management
The Task Force Report suggests a departure from tradition.157 The Report’s call for enhanced post-marketing
surveillance, proposals of patient registries and limitations on prescribing power echo the British post-
marketing approach.158 The same Congressional scrutiny, media attention and consumer lobbying that had
pressured FDA to perform extensive pre-approval investigation now demands strengthening of post-marketing
supervision.159
This shift is reﬂected institutionally in the establishment of FDA’s new Subcommittee on Drug Safety and
Risk Management, a group expected to gain full committee status.160 The group will focus on the safety
153See id..
154See id.
155See id. at 579-580
156See id.
157See Report, supra note 41, at 92.
158See id.
159See id.
160See Francesca Lunzer Kritz, FDA to Weigh New Controls on Problematic Drugs; Lotronex Will Be First for Consideration
by New Panel, Wash. Post., Apr. 16, 2002 at F01.
17issues of approved drugs.161 In discussing the sub-committee, reporter Francesca Lunzer Kritz asks a question
steeped in the traditional philosophy demanding exacting pre-approval scrutiny, “Why not just get all the
kinks out before approving a drug?”162 She answers her own question with acknowledgement of the reality
of drug regulation, “Often all the kinks aren’t known then...often rare side eﬀects don’t show up until a
drug is being used in hundreds of thousands of people.”163 Among the sub-committee’s concerns will be
demands that already approved drugs be banned from the market.164 Other risk management missions
of the group are suggested by the experiences of its members.165 Members include the Director for the
Institute for Safe Medication Practices, a nonproﬁt organization concentrating on medication errors, and a
psychologist who has studied risk communication via patient package inserts.166 At its most recent meeting,
the sub-committee considered re-introducing the irritable bowel syndrome drug, Lotronex, despite its side
aﬀect of ischemic colitis.167 Two more meetings are scheduled for this year.168
Accutane regulation illustrates the ideological shift underlying the sub-committee’s establishment. Part III
traces the drug’s regulatory history with its increasing emphasis on strengthening post-marketing Accutane
controls.
III. History of Accutane Regulation
A. Acne
161See id.
162See id.
163See id.
164See id.
165See id.
166See id
167See id.
168See id.
18Accutane is prescribed to combat acne.169 The basic cause of acne is unknown, but scientists know that
it is a disease of the pilosebaceous units.170 These consist of oil glands connected to hair follicles.171 In
acne patients, the lining of the hair follicle changes to prevent sebum, the oily substance produced by the
sebaceous gland, from passing through the follicle to the skin’s surface.172 In normal patients, the sebum
empties onto the skin’s surface through the follicle.173 By contrast, the cells lining the acne patient’s follicle
shed too quickly and clump together to block the follicle’s opening.174 As the sebum remains trapped in the
skin, bacteria that normally live harmlessly on the skin grows in the hair follicle and produce inﬂammation
causing chemicals.175 The pilosebaceous units are most common on the areas of the body on which acne is
most likely to appear—the face, scalp upper back and chest.176
Acne is generally classiﬁed by the kinds of lesions on the patient’s body.177 Often, however, doctors can
debate the appropriate classiﬁcation of a condition.178 Patients may suﬀer from diﬀerent kind of lesions
simultaneously.179 Accutane was originally indicated for severe cystic acne, a disease that results in large,
painful and scarring lesions.180 Deﬁning cystic acne has been an important issue in determining the appro-
priate use of Accutane.181
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19B. Acne Treatments
The ﬁrst step doctors usually recommend for acne treatment is gentle cleansing of the skin.182 According
to the American Academy of Dermatology, the skin should be washed twice daily with water and a mild
cleanser.183 This reduces excess oils on the skin’s surface.184 Yet washing is rarely a suﬃcient remedy
and medication is normally required.185 Most patients start by applying an over-the-counter gel, cream or
lotions several times a day.186 Topical treatments often contain either benzoyl peroxide, salicylic acid, sulfur
or resorcinol.187 These popular treatments prevent follicles from plugging. Benzoyl peroxide-containing
products can also inhibit bacterial overgrowth.188 Yet many patients also require prescription medications.189
Doctors prescribe antibiotics in either pill or topical form to stop or slow the growth of bacteria.190 In
addition, drugs called retinoids, of which Accutane is an example, combat acne by unplugging blocked
follicles or reducing the amount of sebum produced.191
C. Accutane
Accutane is an oral retinoid, also known as isotretinoin.192 The drug is a Vitamin A derivative.193 By
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20reducing gland size and diﬀerentiation, it lowers sebum production.194 With less sebum in the skin, fewer
pores clog and less nutrition becomes available for organisms such as Proprionibacterium acnes, which lives
in the follicle and causes the body’s inﬂammatory response.195 In addition, Accutane itself is an anti-
inﬂammatory; it soothes pre-existing lesions to minimize scarring. In short, Accutane is a uniquely eﬀective
acne treatment.196 Many patients who undergo a complete course of Accutane treatment for 15 to 20 weeks
enjoy a complete and prolonged remission of the disease.197
D. Accutane’s Invention
Accutane was ﬁrst developed in Switzerland in 1955.198 At the time, its inventors recognized its terato-
genicity, or ability to cause birth defects.199 The drug’s inventor has suggested that after the thalidomide
tragedy, the use of a teratogenic drug for as seemingly benign an ailment as acne was likely to meet much
opposition.200
E. FDA Approval of Accutane
In the late 1970s, however, Roche began testing Accutane as a treatment for severe recalcitrant acne.201
The deﬁnition of this condition has been debated amongst doctors and regulators.202 Some try to classify
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21the condition by the number and type of lesions on the patient’s body.203 Others object to quantifying the
classiﬁcation and argue that individual doctors must diagnose the condition patient by patient rather than
through a rigid general formula.204 Some argue that the original deﬁnition of severity has changed over
time.205
FDA approved the drug in May 1982, making the U.S. the ﬁrst country to approve Accutane as a severe
recalcitrant cystic acne treatment.206 Roche had conducted clinical trials including 550 subject and tested
the drug at four universities and the National Cancer Institute.207 FDA approval came nine months after the
NDA submission, causing some critics to question the speed with which the drug was approved—an unusual
criticism of FDA at a time when most critics considered the agency overly cautious.208 Widespread media
coverage of the drug as a miraculous cure and relatively little media attention devoted to its risks worried
some.209 Indeed, the drug’s original package insert warned that pregnant women should not take the drug,
but it explicitly stated only that Accutane caused birth defects in animals.210
F. Education and Communication
Following Accutane’s marketing, FDA and Roche made education the cornerstone of the drug’s risk man-
agement program.211 One commentator Joan H. Krause, contrasts this incremental risk communication
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22strategy with the “sweeping changes of regulatory policy” prompted by the Thalidomide tragedy.212 Yet
Krause’s characterization of the publicity eﬀorts undertaken by FDA and Roche as “minor” conﬂicts with
many commentators characterization of the regulatory attention devoted to the drug as unprecedented.”213
Dr. Mary Spraker, in her statement at the 1991 Advisory Committee Meetings on Accutane, argues, “Never
in the history of drug prescribing has more been done to educate physicians and patients about the terato-
genicity of a medication.”214 Krause herself acknowledges that FDA demonstrated laudable creativity and
ﬂexibility in the Accutane regulation and education eﬀorts undertaken during this period.215
Roche notiﬁed doctors of several cases Accutane related birth defects in “Dear Doctors” letters.216 Similarly,
in August 1983, FDA reported 12 cases of Accutane related “adverse pregnancy outcomes.”217 Soon there-
after Public Citizen charged that Accutane’s warnings against pregnancy exposure were inadequate and that
the drug was over-prescribed.218 Roche soon changed Accutane’s labeling to make clear the risk of human
birth defects.219
In 1984, after reports of 21 Accutane related birth defects and 24 spontaneous abortions, Dr. Paul J.
Benke identiﬁed an “isotretinoin teratogen syndrome.”220 Benke had studied two children born to Accutane
users.221 Based on this study, he detailed a syndrome characterized by ear, face and central nervous system
problems.222 Frequently infants exposed to the drug during pregnancy suﬀered from mental retardation.223
Benke reported that Accutane could even cause birth defects if taken by a pregnant women only brieﬂy
during the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy, when many women are unaware of their pregnancy.224
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23The same year, Roche and FDA intensiﬁed warnings about Accutane’s teratogenicity.225 Patients were ad-
vised to use contraception for a month before and after Accutane treatment, and blood banks were asked
to reject donations from those exposed to the drug.226 Roche developed an Accutane education program
targeted at physicians; in a “Medical Director’s Page” printed in the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation, Roche emphasized Accutane’s dangers in pregnant women.227 In her testimony to the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Dr. Jonca Bull, Deputy Oﬃce Director of the FDA
Oﬃce of Drug Evaluation outlined the education eﬀorts made during these years including:
1) physician labeling changes; 2) repeated mailing of special letters to doctors and pharmacists
detailing proper use and emphasizing the risks; 3) two articles in FDA’s Drug Bulletin, which
reached more than a million health professionals, emphasizing proper prescribing of Accutane; 4)
distribution to patients through doctors of a patient information leaﬂet highlighting the risks; 5)
distribution to pharmacists of red warning stickers to be placed on each prescription bottle; and 6)
issuance of press releases and background papers to the general news media for use in warning the
public about the risks associated with Accutane.228
Yet by 1988 there was evidence that many women were still using the drug despite having relatively mild
acne.229 The Center for Disease Control published a report of four cases of serious birth defects resulting
from Accutane between 1983 and1987.230 The CDC article also noted additional cases of birth defects.231
Thus, FDA convened a Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee (the “Committee”) meeting to address the
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24problem.232 Experts from several medical specialties and scientists from the CDC, FDA, Hoﬀman-La Roche,
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy
of Dermatology participated in day-long proceedings.233 In a unanimous vote, the Committee recommended
the continued sale of Accutane with revised labeling and increased restrictions on the drug’s distribution234
The Committee called for new packaging featuring stronger warnings and more explicit information about
Accutane’s risks.235 It also recommended that the drug only be used in women who have had a negative
pregnancy test.236 Finally, it recommended written acknowledgement from patients that they had been
informed of Accutane’s risk of birth defects.237
In a split vote, the committee also proposed the adoption of several other measures.238 Some committee
members suggested that the government empower only certain types of physicians to dispense the drug.239
Others called for the imposition of special restrictions for high risk patients, including a requirement that
high risk female patients obtain a second opinion.240 Other suggestions focused on physician awareness
of Accutane’s risks and proposed doctor certiﬁcation for Accutane distribution though an education pro-
gram.241 Finally, the Committee recommended that the use and adverse events associated with Accutane
be continually monitored.242
In May 1988, FDA issued a letter to Hoﬀman-La Roche discussing eﬀective risk communication.243 While
drug warnings usually appear in a package insert accompanying a drug, FDA asked that Accutane warnings
appear on the blister pack containing the drug itself.244 These warnings included pictures depicting the
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25severe physical abnormalities of those with Accutane-related birth defects.245 In addition, to facilitate the
monitoring of Accutane’s risks, the blister pack was to include a tear-oﬀ for mailing patient contact infor-
mation to the company.246 FDA also called for research on patient behavior.247 For example, it wanted
further exploration of why patients become pregnant while using Accutane.248 FDA then asked that both
physicians and female patients signed a form acknowledging that they understood the serious likelihood that
severe birth defects could result from pregnancy exposure to Accutane249.
FDA also focused on health care professional’s education.250 It demanded more detailed physician and
patient labeling, further educational campaigns for physicians, pharmacists as well as patients and advertise-
ments discussing Accutane’s risks.251 Finally FDA asked that Roche run further clinical trials investigating
the eﬀectiveness of Accutane when taken at diﬀerent doses for diﬀerent period of time; shortening the length
of Accutane therapy or the dosage of the drug could aﬀect the risk of pregnancy exposure.252
G. Roche Pregnancy Prevention Program
By mid-1989, Roche used this risk management framework to develop a “Pregnancy Prevention Program
for Women on Accutane”.253 In May 1990, the Committee again evaluated the program’s eﬀectiveness
and determined that the company had made a strong education eﬀort. 254 Nevertheless the data on its
eﬀectiveness were limited. In 1990, one case of Accutane related birth defects was reported. In 1989, there
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26were four reports and in 1988 there were three.255 Ten such reports were made in 1987 and twelve were
made in 1986.256
However, the Committee made several additional recommendations. It suggested that educational materials
place greater emphasis on pregnancy testing prior to the commencement of Accutane therapy.257 It also
suggested that physicians emphasize the importance of the informed consent forms to their patients and that
the forms be presented in several languages.258 Pregnancy prevention counseling was deemed an important
component of the risk management scheme; physicians were asked to emphasize it.259 Finally the Committee
proposed that Roche address the danger that patients will take Accutane without medical supervision by
saving leftover medication.260 The Committee recommended that Roche arrange for the return of all leftover
medication.261
In September 2000 the Committee re-visited its discussion of fetal exposures. It decided that three princi-
ples should guide an Accutane risk management strategy on this topic.262 First, no pregnant woman should
begin Accutane treatment. Second, no one should become pregnant while using Accutane.263 Finally, to
evaluate the program’s eﬀectiveness in meeting these goals, a monitoring program should assess results.264
The Committee considered the ﬁve designs FDA proposed for upholding the principles and by a majority,
chose a program including education and informed consent, the registration of both patients and physicians
who would fully participate in the program, the monitoring of fetal exposures using a program involving a
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27pregnancy registry, and surveys.265 The Committee rejected some proposals for the restricted distribution
of the drug however.266
On October 31 2001, FDA released a Talk Paper outlining a new program designed to achieve the preg-
nancy prevention goals established at the September 2000 meeting.267 The program is called S.M.A.R.T.,
System to Manage Accutane Related Teratogenicity. Pursuant to its provisions, prescribers must study
the S.M.A.R.T. “Guide to Best Practices,” developed by Roche and then sign and return to the company
a Letter of Understanding certifying their understanding.268 Prescribers are also urged to take a half-day
Continuing Medical Education course also developed by Roche in which speciﬁc pregnancy prevention tactics
are discussed.269 Roche then sends to prescribers special self-adhesive Accutane Qualiﬁcation Stickers.270
The prescriber must attach this yellow sicker to their regular prescription form to permit pharmacists to
dispense the drug. Female patient’s “qualiﬁcation” for Accutane entails a negative pregnancy test and edu-
cation and counseling about pregnancy prevention.271 No prescriptions are to be given for more than a one
month supply so that pregnancy tests can be given monthly.272
Female patients take two urine and serum pregnancy tests prior to receiving an Accutane prescription.273 If
the tests are negative they receive a prescription for a one month supply of Accutane.274 They must have
another negative pregnancy test each month before receiving another prescription. Sexually active patients,
or patients who might become sexually active with a male partner must also use two forms of eﬀective con-
traception simultaneously.275 Contraception use must begin at least one month before the start of Accutane
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28treatment, continue throughout treatment and for at least one month after the completion of treatment.276
Female patients must sign a “Patients Information/Consent” form discussing Accutane’s teratogenicity.277
They are also asked to participate in the Accutane Survey, a conﬁdential survey conducted by the Slone
Epidemiology Unit of the Boston University School of Public Health studying S.M.A.R.T.’s eﬀectiveness in
minimizing fetal exposures.278
Pharmacists will only dispense Accutane if the patient presents a prescription with an Accutane Qualiﬁcation
Sticker.279 The maximum quantity pharmacists may provide is a one month supply.280 They will also only
ﬁll prescriptions within seven days of the “qualiﬁcation” date281 All patients will receive with the drug a
Medication Guide detailing the drug’s risks, and pharmacists will refuse requests for more Accutane without
a new prescription or with only a phoned-in prescription.282 An independent audit of pharmacies will assess
prescriber’s use of Accutane Qualiﬁcation Stickers.283
H. Depression and Suicide
While controversy over Accutane related birth defects has intensiﬁed, the alleged psychiatric risks of the drug
have also garnered increasing attention.284 Some suggest that Accutane causes depression and suicide.285
No reports of either problem appeared in Accutane’s original NDA safety database.286 Post-marketing, how-
ever, there were reports of depression in Accutane users. Again education became the center of an Accutane
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29risk management strategy.287 In the mid-1980s the drug’s labeling was changed to provide, “Depression has
been reported in some patients on Accutane therapy.288 In some of these patients, this has subsided with
discontinuation of therapy and recurred with reinstitution of therapy.”289 The adverse reaction section of
the labeling was also changed to explain, “The following CNS reactions have been reported and may bear
no relation to therapy: seizures, emotional instability, dizziness, nervousness, drowsiness, malaise, weakness,
insomnia, lethargy and paresthias.”290
In 1996, an FDA physician noted two cases of suicide in a listing of recent adverse events associated with
Accutane.291 FDA began a re-evaluation of the drug’s potential link to suicide.292 Dr. Bull noted that
reports such as those noted in 1996 do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship between depression and
Accutane use.293 Nevertheless, FDA epidemiology specialists investigated the potential link.294
Although these investigators did not scientiﬁcally establish a causal relationship, they did make ﬁndings
suggestive of a causal link.295 FDA compared the number of reports to the “background rate,” the rate of
depression and suicide expected to be seen in the population likely to receive Accutane, teens and young
adults.296 There were not many reports relative to the expected incidence of these problems in the teen
and young adult population.297 Yet details of some of the reports warranted further attention. Some of the
patients had apparently never experienced psychiatric symptoms prior to their Accutane treatment; there
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30was no other apparent reason for their symptoms.298 Other patients experienced depression upon beginning
Accutane therapy and reported that the symptoms ended soon after the treatment ended.299 Some reported
that the symptoms reappeared when Accutane therapy resumed.300
On March 3, 1997, French oﬃcials required that suicide be listed as a possible side aﬀect of the drug.301
FDA began working with Roche in May 1997 to address the possibility of Accutane related depression.302
In February 1998, Accutane’s professional label in the U.S. was again changed to explicitly highlight the
risk of suicide.303 The label provided, “Psychiatric Disorders: Accutane may cause depression, psychosis,
and rarely suicidal ideation, suicide attempts and suicide. Discontinuation of Accutane therapy may be
insuﬃcient; further evaluation may be necessary. No mechanism of action has been established for these
events. (see Adverse reactions: Psychiatric).”304 The adverse reactions section listed, “ psychiatric: suicidal
ideation, suicide attempts, suicide, depression, psychosis (see warnings: Psychiatric Disorders), emotional
instability.”305
Doctors who might prescribe Accutane and those likely to see patients with psychiatric disturbances also
received a letter about the drug.306 A special notice on the FDA website and a Talk Paper released to the
press were also made available.307
Yet Roche was also running media advertisements touting Accutane’s pycho-social beneﬁts; the company
implied that by treating acne the drug improves the patient’s state of mind, increasing conﬁdence and social
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31skills.308 On March 8, 1998, FDA requested that these advertisements end.309 FDA deemed the advertise-
ments false and misleading.310
The patient information regarding Accutane had included mood changes as a “sign” of potentially serious
problem even before the 1998 professional labeling changes.311 Patients were advised to stop taking Accu-
tane and to contact their doctors if they experienced mood changes.312 In 1998, FDA revised the patient
information to provide speciﬁc information about the possible outcomes of a broader range of serious adverse
events.313 An interim version of this re-designed information appeared in the summer of 2000 and described
the possibility that suicide can result from the mood disorders.314 FDA critiqued this version and found
that the risks were not fully described.315 Roche agreed to explore further revisions.316
Soon after the 1998 labeling change FDA and Roche embarked on further study of the possible connec-
tion between Accutane and psychiatric disorders.317 Roche conducted several studies and participated in
frequent working meetings with FDA.318 Yet the studies provided no deﬁnitive evidence of a causal link
between Accutane use and psychiatric disorders.319
In October 2000 Accutane’s potential psychiatric risks received widespread attention when ﬁve-term Con-
gressman and member of the House Committee with FDA oversight, Bart Stupak (D., Mich), and his wife
Jamie appeared on NBC-TV’s Today Show to discuss the May 2000 suicide of their 17-year-old son B.J. Stu-
pak.320 The teenager shot himself in the head after a post-prom party thrown for his high school friends.321
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32B.J. Stupak had undergone Accutane therapy for seven months prior to his suicide and the Stupaks accused
Accutane of causing his death.322 Congressman Stupak criticized FDA’s management of Accutane risks
saying:
All these people are dying, suicide thoughts, depressed, being hospitalized. The reports are coming
into the FDA and they don’t do anything? It takes you two and a half years to put a warning on a
package. Where are they? Who’s watching out? If the watchdog, the FDA, is not watching out for
our children, and the consumers and the parents, who’s watching out for us?323
Yet defenders of the drug and of FDA’s risk management eﬀorts argue that instead of being objective
investigators of Accutane’s risks, the Stupaks were grieving parents desperately seeking a reason for their
son’s death.324 Indeed some suggest that their criticism of Accutane merely deﬂects attention from more
likely contributors to their son’s suicide—their absence during his party and his access to alcohol and to a
gun.325
Nevertheless, the Dermatologic and Opthalmic Drugs Advisory Committee met again in September 2000.326
It discussed these studies of Accutane’s link to depression and noted that a controlled masked clinical
study was unlikely due to ethical and technical reasons.327 The Committee tried to explore other research
strategies with the expert participants in the 2000 Committee hearings.328 After examining the issue of
psychiatric events, the Committee agreed that the risk remained uncertain.329 Nevertheless, it considered
the exploration of additional risk management strategies necessary because of the degree of concern about the
drug.330 Speciﬁcally, it called for the addition of information about psychiatric adverse events to the consent
form patients and physicians sign upon beginning Accutane therapy.331 The Committee also recommended
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33that Roche provide an enhanced prescriber education program on psychiatric events and a Medication Guide
for Accutane.332 These MedGuides, patient information books, are generally only required by FDA for the
few drugs that it believes pose serious risks.333 Further testimony on Accutane’s possible association with
psychiatric disorders took place before the House Committee on Government Reform in December 2000
The issue has also reached the courts. On April 11, 2002, however, one jury rejected an Oklahoma’s woman’s
claim for $3 million in compensatory damages for her psychiatric problems; the plaintiﬀ, 39-year-old Carla
Gray, accused Roche of negligence, but Roche’s expert witnesses testiﬁed that no study demonstrates a
causal link between Accutane use and depression.334
Nevertheless, another high proﬁle law suit is now underway.335 It was brought on April 15th by Julie
Bishop and Karen Johnson, the mother and grandmother respectively of 15-year old Charles Bishop , a
St. Petersburg Florida teen who committed suicide by ﬂying a stolen plane into the 28th ﬂoor of a Tampa
building.336 Karen Johnson has reported that her grandson had been taking Accutane twice daily for 10
months prior to his suicide and that the drug must have made him severely psychotic.337 She and her
daughter now seek $70 million in a wrongful death action.338
Others are skeptical of Accutane’s role in the suicide and even called concerns about Accutane and mental
health risks “hysteria.”339 One commentator views the allegations of Accutane’s role in the suicide as
symptomatic of society’s misguided demand for deﬁnitive explanations of tragic situations. She writes, “We
332See id.
333See id.
334See Daily Brieﬁng, Atlanta Jrnl & Const. (Apr. 17, 2002), at 2D.
335See Richard Jerome and Don Sider, The Lost Boy: Grieving Mom Julie Bishop Blames and Acne Drug for her Son’s
Bizarre, Tragic Suicide, People (Apr. 29, 2002), at 107.
336See id.
337See id.
338See id.
339See Phillip W. DeVous, Think Tank Wrap-up, United Press International, Jan 24, 2002. (arguing that no biological
evidence supports the drug’s link with suicide and no trace of the drug was found in Charles Bishop’s bloodstream following
the suicide.)
34want answers. Then we want to ﬁx whatever it is that caused the bad thing to happen. The truth is, we
cannot ﬁx everything. There are not answers to everything.”340
Despite its contention that no evidence suggests that Accutane causes depression, Roche has sent to more
than 10,000 dermatologists a brochure concerning depression and suicide.341 FDA approved the brochure
and Roche prepared it with the help of outside experts.342 The brochure informs dermatologists about
the psychiatric issues most likely to be encountered in Accutane users and provides them with guidance in
identifying signs of depression and other psychiatric disorders.343
Accutane’s alleged depression victims ﬁnd it more diﬃcult those with Accutane related birth defects to prove
that the drug caused their illness. Yet the alleged risk has the potential to provide an even more compelling
rationale for regulation. Accutane’s teratogenicity primarily puts fertile female patients and their unborn
children at risk. Psychiatric risks, by contrast, may eﬀect both men and women, young and old
I. Patent Expiration
Roche itself has voiced new concerns about t Accutane’s risks and the importance of Accutane regulation.344
The last Accutane patent expired on February 7, 2002. On February 5th, Roche ﬁled a petition with the
FDA asking it not to approve generic versions of the drug until generic manufacturers instituted the rigorous
safety precautions Roche has already put in place.345 Roche has argued that the distribution of generic
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35versions of the drug could complicate the already diﬃcult task of tracking fetal exposures to the drug.346
Critics of Roche allege that the petition is merely designed to ward oﬀ competitors; generic makers of the
drug are usually able to sell their product more cheaply.347 In the ﬁrst nine months of 2001, Accutane
was the company’s third best-selling drug.348 It accounted for $498 million in sales.349 Mylan Laboratories
reports that it expects to win approval of its generic version this year, and generics are predicted to captured
at least 20 to 25 percent of the U.S. Accutane market within a year.350 Although the Roche petition could
delay approval of generic products, the safety concerns at stake are formidable351 FDA is reviewing the
petition and has 180 days to comment.352
IV. Regulatory Dilemmas Exempliﬁed by Accutane Regulation
Accutane regulation and FDA’s growing emphasis on post-approval controls emerge amidst fundamental
regulatory dilemmas. These basic tensions, inherent in a regime that seeks to maximize both drug safety
and availability, are placed into sharp relief by the Accutane experience.
A. Pre-Approval Clinical Testing:
Despite the increasing attention paid to post-approval regulation, Dr Jane Henney has emphasized, “it is
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36imperative that FDA maintain high standards in its pre-market decision-making and at the same time ex-
amine whether risks are managed throughout the healthcare delivery system.”353 Pre-market drug testing
plays an important role in ensuring drug safety.354 Yet Accutane exempliﬁes the limits of even the most
rigorous pre-market testing.
To best investigate drug safety, pre-clinical tests should study the drug’s eﬀect on patients resembling those
who will actually take the drug and under conditions that mirror those patients actual circumstances.355
Yet the people for whom the drug is intended usually have characteristics that make them particularly vul-
nerable to the excessive danger of a pre-approval study—illness and advanced age for example.356 Thus, the
very patients most likely to use a drug post-marketing may be excluded from the pre-approval tests.357 In
addition, women and racial and ethnic minorities are often underrepresented in studies, despite increasing
belief that drugs may aﬀect diﬀerent races and sexes diﬀerently.358 Pregnant women are often excluded
from clinical studies to avoid jeopardizing the health of the fetus.359 In their place, laboratory animals
are tested.360 Yet sometimes even female laboratory animals are excluded because their hormonal changes
complicate studies.361
Pre-clinical testing of Accutane exempliﬁes this problem.362 Laboratory tests showed that Accutane was
teratogenic in rabbits and rats.363 Thus, women were excluded from most test centers.364 Elsewhere, fe-
male participants were subject to several requirements to prevent fetal exposures; they needed to have a
negative pregnancy test before receiving the drug, use eﬀective contraceptives while taking the drug and
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37agree to abort any pregnancy conceived during treatment.365 Because of these safeguards, no documented
cases of Accutane related birth defects emerged from the tests.366 As a result, the drug’s original labeling
only reported that birth defects had occurred in laboratory animals.367 Some have criticized the omission
of explicit reference to the risks of birth defects in humans and the failure to require that post-approval
female patients comply with the same pregnancy prevention program required of female pre-approval test
subjects.368 While Krause argues that ethical constrains often make the study of pregnant women infeasible,
the Accutane experience suggests, for her, that special care should be taken to ensure that the potential
risks to excluded test populations are well publicized.369
The Accutane experience also suggests that the most carefully designed pre-approval tests may fail to detect
a drug’s side eﬀects. There were no reports of psychiatric side eﬀects during Accutane’s clinical trials.370
Accutane’s link with depression remains uncertain and this may account for the lack of reports.371 Reports
of depression post-marketing are lower than reports of the illness in the general population.372 Dr. Douglas
G. Jacobs, Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and consultant to Roche,
contends that there is no biochemical basis for Accutane’s alleged association with psychiatric disorders.373
Yet if depression is a rare side eﬀect of the drug, then like many rare risks, it may only appear after much
larger numbers of people use the drug outside of the controlled testing environment.374 Some risks are so
rare that they will only appear is a very small proportion of people treated with the drug.375 FDA’s post-
marketing initiatives reﬂect growing acceptance of the “unpalatable truth” that mass marketing is mass
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370See House Hearings, supra note 37 (statement of Dr. Jonca Bull)
371See id.
372See id.
373See House Hearings, supra note 37 (statement of Dr. Douglas G. Jacobs)
374See Teﬀ, supra note 32, at 579.
375See id.
38experimentation.376
Pre-approval testing is particularly ill-equipped to detect psychiatric risks.377 At the 2000 Advisory Com-
mittee Hearings, Dr. Erick Turner reported that “when these drugs are being developed, there’s very rarely,
if ever, an a priori suspicion that the drug might cause depression. So, it’s not rigorously looked for. Usually
this comes up post-marketing, and they’re picked up as case reports by clinicians.”378
B. Oﬀ-label Usage
Charles H. Stoney Jackson, Jr., father of an Accutane patient who committed suicide has demanded, “How
can a doctor prescribe a medication that is clearly licensed to be used as a treatment of last resort and for
the most severe cases of acne. Clay’s [his son’s] acne was very mild, there was no reason for Clay to be using
Accutane.”379
Once a drug is approved for marketing, individual doctors may decide how and when to prescribe that
drug.380 Following company prescribing guidelines included in a drug’s package insert is voluntary.381 Of
course, physicians are often encouraged to comply with the guidelines by the desire use the drug safely,
to provide the best service to the patient and to avoid malpractice litigation.382 Yet oﬀ-label use is only
indirectly constrained by these concerns.383
Oﬀ-label usage is a feature of American drug regulation intimately connected with the traditional assump-
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Accutane.)
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39tions about pre-approval testing.384 If the FDA takes into account uses and abuses of the drug in addition
to those for which the drug was originally developed, then the pre-approval trials would demonstrate the
safety of most oﬀ-label uses.385 Indeed FDA’s safety evaluation considers other probable uses or potential
abuses of a drug when there is speciﬁc evidence that such use or abuse is likely to occur.386 However, the
inherent limitations of the pre-approval process call into question the wisdom of oﬀ-label usage.387 Oﬀ-label
usage compounds the diﬃculty of generalizing safety results to patient populations that diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from test groups and the risk of overlooking rare or long-term side eﬀects.388 The applicability of safety data
to actual patient populations lessens as the drug is prescribed for conditions other than those for which the
drug was intended.389
Nevertheless, there are signiﬁcant advantages to oﬀ-label usage.390 Allowing oﬀ-label usage preserves physi-
cian autonomy and permits the doctors most familiar with the nuances of a patient’s condition to determine
that particular patient’s need for a drug.391 Strict constraints on a doctor’s ability to prescribe oﬀ-label
often require general practice rules that overlook the optimal treatment for the individual.392 In addition,
innovative uses of a drug may be discovered when physicians have the ﬂexibility to prescribe oﬀ-label.393
It would be prohibitively expensive to test each potentially beneﬁcial drug use from the laboratory stage
forward.394
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40Because doctors may prescribe Accutane oﬀ-label, they have been able to treat other skin disorders with the
drug.395 In addition, the drug is used as a cancer treatment.396 Accutane contains fenretinide, a substance
shown to kill cancer cells including cervical cancer and myeloid leukemia.397 Memorial Sloan Kettering
currently uses the drug as part of its Neuroblastoma Program to combat the rare, and often fatal, childhood
cancer.398
In stark contrast to Jackson’s testimony is another father’s applause of Accutane’s oﬀ-label use; Scott
Finestone credits Accutane with prolonging the life of his son, a neuroblastoma patient receives Accutane
therapy.399 When administered along with bone marrow transplants, Accutane signiﬁcantly improves remis-
sion in children with high risk neuroblastoma.400 Doctors have also tried, albeit unsuccessfully to date, to
use Accutane to treat non-small-cell lung cancer.401 Prohibiting oﬀ-label use risks stiﬂing such creativity.402
Nevertheless, many critics charge that Accutane is over-prescribed for milder acne cases.403 As early as
September 1983, Ralph Nader aﬃliated- Health Research Group charged that Accutane was being “overpre-
scribed.”404 The drug had been approved in 1982 to treat “severe recalcitrant acne.”405 Critics have insisted
that the drug was only intended for those with the most serious form of the disease; only in these cases did
the drug’s risks seem acceptable.406 Yet the drug was widely touted in the media as a miracle cure for acne
generally.407
395See 1988 Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of Dr. Gary L. Peck) ( noting that Accutane has been used to treat acne
fulmanenet, meyhahans hidradentitis supparativa and keratonization disorders)
396See id.
397See Carolyn Susman, ‘Bad’ Medicine Turned Good, Palm Beach Post, Apr. 4, 2002, at 1E.
398See id.
399See id.
400See id.
401See id.
402See id.
403See Diane Knich, Acne Drug Safeguards; Acne Drug Restrictions, Pregnancy Tests Aim to Curb Birth Defects, Wash.
Post, Apr. 9, 2002, at F01.
404See Hilts, supra note 217.
405See id.
406See id.
407See Krause, supra note 3, at 21.
41Worries about over-prescription dominated debates at the 1988 Advisory Committee Hearings.408 Dr. David
Graham, Group Leader of the Epidemiology Branch of the Oﬃce of Epidemiology and Biostatistics argued
that Accutane was too frequently prescribed for mild acne cases.409 To limit oﬀ-label use, Public Citizen
petitioned FDA in May 1988 to limit Accutane prescribing to board-certiﬁed or board eligible dermatol-
ogists.410 Dermatologists would have had to register with FDA and receive an FDA prescriber number
under this scheme.411 The petition demanded that Accutane prescribers certify that they had read and had
promised to follow the drug’s labeling and regulations.412 Public Citizen also called upon FDA to prohibit
pharmacists from ﬁlling prescriptions from unregistered doctors and to subject both non-compliant doctors
and pharmacists to criminal prosecution.413
Yet dermatologists participating in the 1988 Advisory Committee hearings strongly disputed Graham’s
estimates and objected to the negative portrayal of the dermatologist they implied.414 They regarded
Graham’s data and methodology as ﬂawed and argued that most Accutane use was appropriate.415 They
also noted that Accutane prescriptions decreased dramatically since Accutane-related birth defects were ﬁrst
reported in 1983.416 They also rejected Graham’s claim that 85 percent of the female patients treated with
Accutane had not initially been treated with antibiotics.417 Instead they argued that, in the vast majority
of cases, dermatologists only use Accutane after ensuring that the patient’s disease is resistant to safer forms
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42of therapy.418
Yet, Dr. Lynn Silver, a pediatrician and public health expert on the staﬀ of the Health Research Group,
contended that regardless of the exact proportion of Accutane patients lacking the indicated condition, a
signiﬁcant amount of oﬀ-label use was occurring.419 For Silver, “ Even if only one-half of the prescriptions
for women was inappropriate this means that one-half of the birth defects and one-half of the abortions
which occur to aﬀected women, occurred to women who did not have a valid reason for taking this drug.”420
Silver’s remarks beg a fundamental question implicit in the oﬀ-label usage debate. What exactly constitutes
a valid reason for taking the drug? Varying answers to the question reﬂect diﬀerent conceptions of acne.
Although doctors of all specialties share the power to prescribe Accutane, they do not share a view on
the appropriate circumstances in which to use it.421 Their disagreement reﬂects how notions of a disease
inﬂuence its regulation.
While many dermatologists view acne as incredibly intrusive on daily life, many pediatricians suggest that
these concerns pale in comparison to the devastation of birth defects.422 Indeed, Dr. James L. Mills of the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, noted that the physicians present at the 1988
hearings were split into two opposing camps; the dermatologists and the pediatricians.423
Dermatologists suggest that disﬁguring acne causes as many emotional as physical scars.424 Dermatologists
make a compelling claim that Accutane heals psychological as well as physical wounds.425 This notion of
Accutane was put forward at the 2000 Committee hearings by Dr. Stephen Webster. One of his patients,
418
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43a 22-year old female college graduate with cystic acne had a marketing degree and several job interviews,
but “her cystic acne is quite prominent, and in the marketing world this severely hampers her chance at
a position. This acne scars more than her skin, it also scars her self-image.”426 Severe cystic acne had a
similar eﬀect on a 24 year old investment banker Dr. Webster treated.427 Dr Webster reports, “the marked
facial acne cysts with a potential to scar make it diﬃcult for him to establish his credentials...will people
invest their money with someone with an ‘adolescent’ disease like acne.”428 Thus for Dr. Webster, “The
eﬀects of cystic scarring acne in any patient, but especially in young adults starting their careers, can be
extensive and go beyond the skin by eﬀecting their lives.”429
Similarly, Nancy Vargo, President of the Dermatology Nurses Association testiﬁed that a teenager in her
family suﬀered from acne that “lowered his sense of self-worth and conﬁdence and inhibited his ability
to establish relationships with his peer and with others...Accutane...not only cured his acne...but the
teenager came alive...he can go about the business of growing up.”430
Yet others counter that Accutane-exposed babies rarely have the opportunity to grow up at all.431 They
are aﬄicted with severely disﬁguring, physically and mentally debilitating disabilities that rarely aﬀord
them the chance to live independently.432 Indeed, Krause suggests that the very severity of their condition
makes it easy to overlook their plight.433 While many Thalidomide victims are of normal intelligence and
can tell a compelling story of the challenges their disabilities present, Accutane victims cannot voice their
suﬀering.434 Indeed they may not even appear publicly in mere photographs.435 At the 1988 Advisory
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44Committee Hearings such photos were deemed so disturbing they were hidden from view.436 Instead, the
disabilities were merely discussed verbally.437 Initially, Accutane patient labeling contained a photograph of
a baby aﬄicted with Accutane-related birth defects.438 Later however, even this photo was replaced with a
drawing, again making the victim’s suﬀering seem less real.439 By contrast, acne patients can speak of their
trauma and were seen repeatedly.440 Thus, care must be taken to adequately represent the plight of those
exposed to Accutane during pregnancy.
This danger is far less likely to aﬀect the alleged psychiatric victims of Accutane. The high proﬁle suicides
of B.J. Stupak and Charles Bishop are anything but invisible. At the September 2000 Advisory Committee
Hearings, former Accutane patients testiﬁed to the psychiatric illnesses they had struggled with, allegedly
as a result of their Accutane use.441 Thirty-six year old Kimberly Smith described herself as an “Accutane
survivor” after reporting that Accutane induced depression, edginess, stress and despair cost her her job and
her sense of well-being.442 Ms. Smith testiﬁed that although her skin cleared after taking Accutane, her life
crumbled with the mood disorders she experienced.443
Debate over Accutane’s appropriate use reﬂects concerns about physician and patient autonomy. Some
scientists have taken a quantitative approach to deﬁning severe cystic acne problem, noting, for example,
deﬁnitions of ‘severe’ cystic acne as 10 or more deep cystic inﬂammatory lesions, each of 4 millimeter or
more in diameter.”444 The drug’s labeling deﬁnes severe recalcitrant nodular acne stating, “Nodules are
inﬂammatory lesions with a diameter of 5mm or greater.”445 Yet doctors have questioned the applicability
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45of these quantitative approaches to the actual practice of dermatology.446 Dr. Jerome L. Shupack opposed
special post-marketing restrictions on Accutane, arguing “you cannot practice medicine by committee,” and
explained:
I appreciate the eﬀorts to quantitate [sic] what is quantitatable,[sic] but in the ﬁnal analysis there
are many factors which have not been looked at here, including, for one, the emotional impact of
the disease, which you really cannot quantify in terms of the number of cysts or the number of
pustules or what-have-you, which ends up going into the decision process...there are aspects to
duration which are also quantiﬁable and which, again go into the decision-making progress [sic] on
a day-to-day basis. For example, how much money has the patient already spent on the treatment
of acne during the preceding eight to 10 years, how many drugs has he taken, how many side aﬀects
has he already had from the other drugs he has taken?447
Dr. Shupack’s remarks underscore one of the advantages of entrusting doctors with the decision to determine
each patient’s individual needs. General deﬁnitions of severe acne and regulations based on uniform standards
cannot captured the nuances of patient needs.448 In 1988, Dr. Gary Peck, Senior Investigator in the
Dermatology Division of the NIH echoed Dr. Shupack’s concerns asking:
How many scars do you need, how many new acne cysts do you need while on conventional therapy?
How long do you have to remain on conventional therapy before you are deemed adequate to have
Accutane. I think this decision may vary with each physician.449
C. Adverse Reaction Reporting
If physicians currently have the authority to prescribe oﬀ-label, they also have the ethical responsibility
to report adverse reactions to the drugs they prescribe.450 Yet the Accutane experience has highlighted
weaknesses in a post-marketing surveillance programs reliant on voluntary physician reports.451
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46As discussed in Part II, FDA relies on an Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) to detect adverse drug
events.452 Health care professionals and consumers voluntarily submit MedWatch forms detailing adverse
events.453 The drug manufacturers receive approximately 94% of these forms and are required to submit
them to FDA.454 These submissions must be submitted to FDA within 15 days if the event reported is
serious and absent from the packages label.455 The remainder of the MedWatch forms are sent directly to
FDA from the consumer or health care professional.456 MedWatch forms are the basis for individual records
stored in AERS, a computer database developed in 1969 and updated in 1997.457 These records undergo
computer analysis to detect patterns of adverse reactions.458
The advantages of this system lie in its simplicity.459 A small number of reported events easily signals
problems to FDA and prompts further investigation.460 In addition, the system’s simplicity makes it a
relatively inexpensive surveillance device.461 The system is also facilitates hypotheses generation regarding
adverse events and provides valuable case material.462
Nevertheless, FDA acknowledges the system’s limitations.463 The MedWatch forms often lack important
data.464 Reporter often neglect to provide information requested of them. The forms also request descriptions
of the event, but the quality of these case studies varies.465
There is also substantial, unpredictable amounts of under-reporting.466 Although manufacturers are required
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47to do so, they rely on the voluntary reports of health care workers and consumers when making these
reports.467 Health care professionals and consumers may fail to report an event because they are unaware
of the event or of its possible association with drug exposure.468 They may also simply avoid the burdens
of reporting.469 Reporting also occurs unpredictably.470 Serious publicized events may prompt reports, a
Dear Doctor letter containing warnings about a drug or publications regarding the drug in the scientiﬁc or
lay media often sparks reports; events out of the public eye may go unreported471
AERS reports signaled potential Accutane problems to FDA and prompted further action.472 Accutane
related pregnancy outcomes were reported to FDA by mid-1983.473 In response, FDA was able to increase
warnings against the drug’s use in pregnant women and develop education campaigns about the drug’s
risks.474 Similarly, reports of depression in Accutane users reached FDA via its passive post-marketing
monitoring system by the mid-1980s.475 These reports prompted FDA to change the drug’s labeling, educate
dermatologists about psychiatric events and further investigate the potential psychiatric risks.476
Yet AERS fails to provide the data essential to scientiﬁc investigation of the reported conditions.477 An
accurate assessment of the rates of pregnancy exposure to Accutane may be important in deciding how
restrictive an Accutane pregnancy prevention program should be.478 In 1988, Dr. Graham argued that
pregnancy-exposure to Accutane had been greatly underreported under the passive surveillance system.479
There was often an extensive lag between the occurrence of an exposure and its report to FDA.480 In the
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48months leading up to the 1988 hearings, FDA received reports of exposures that had occurred more than nine
months prior to the report.481 Dr. Graham also reported that induced abortion after an Accutane exposure is
not regularly reported to FDA.482 Graham pointed to ﬁgures showing that 55 suspected pregnancy exposures
from Michigan Medicaid and three from Group Health did not readily reach FDA’s attention.483
Concerns about “the inertia of physician reporting in the United States” have been raise with regard to many
drugs.484 In Accutane’s case, the general problem of under-reporting may be exacerbated by an obstetrician’s
actual unawareness of a patient’s Accutane use.485 Dermatologists generally prescribe Accutane; patients
may fail to inform their obstetricians of an Accutane prescription.486 If the patient’s child then suﬀers a
birth defect, the obstetrician may consider the defect a product of chance.487 As a result, Graham argued,
“that the tip of the iceberg has been reported to the manufacturer and FDA.488 There is a whole universe
of pregnancy exposure about which we have no direct information.”489
Similar problems have arisen in studying Accutane’s possible psychiatric risks.490 Indeed the detection and
reporting of psychiatric problems like depression may be even more diﬃcult.491 Dr. Turner reports that
depression is a particularly under-recognized condition. He explains:
Symptoms are often not obvious and cannot be proven wit an x-ray or lab test which may lead to some
increased reluctance on the part of the person to come forward and they might dismiss it thinking,
well maybe it’s all just in my head...symptoms often get dismissed by both the person experiencing
the depression, as well as perhaps family members or possibly even health care professionals.492
Under-reporting may be especially prevalent in adolescents, a group especially likely to suﬀer from acne.493
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49Adolescents often hide symptoms or have symptoms diﬀerent from clinically depressed adults. Adolescent
drug and alcohol problems, a common symptom of depression, are often considered a cause of the illness.494
Mood-swings are also frequently considered natural adolescent experiences rather than signs of depression.495
Further complicating the problem is the possibility that patients perceptions of acne severity itself may
contribute to depression.496 People may be especially unwilling to diagnose adolescents with a potentially
stigmatizing disease.
By limiting Accutane to certain prescribers and requiring patient registration, countries like Britain have
monitored adverse events more closely.497 As discussed further below, the advantages of closer monitoring
may be outweighed disadvantages such as reduced drug availability.
D. Accutane Education
Successful risk management is as much about communicating information as it is about gathering it. Educa-
tion, rather than distribution limitations, had been the hallmark of Accutane regulation from its approval in
1983.498 As increasing numbers of birth defects were reported in the 1980s, Accutane’s labeling was consis-
tently changed to include increasingly stronger, more detailed warnings.499 Roche also advertised the drug’s
risk’s in medical and pharmacy journals.500 In May 1984, FDA’s Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee
rejected restrictions on the drug’s availability and favored further warnings to ensure proper use and mini-
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50mize its risks.501 These publicity eﬀorts continued until the 1988 Advisory Committee suggested unusually
strict limits on the drug’s use.502 Yet FDA was reluctant to limit access to the drug. Instead it required risk
communication measures such as revised patient labeling.503 On September 19, 1988, unique “Pregnancy
Prevention Kits” were distributed.504 Labels then depicted children with typical Accutane related defor-
mities, a “non-pregnancy symbol” on every page.505 Revised physician labeling advised against prescribing
the drug to patients who failed to understand its risks and that patients have a negative pregnancy test
within 2 weeks of beginning treatment.506 Also developed were a detailed informed consent form, a revised
patient brochure also featuring the Accutane victim depiction, and blister packaging with non-pregnancy
symbols on the packaging of each dose and tear-oﬀ post-cards for patients to provide information about
informed consent.507 By October 1989, Roche had launched an unusual advertising campaign directed at
dermatologists and stressing Accutane’s risks rather than its beneﬁts.508 By 1991, the company had also
developed an Accutane videocassette for patients to view in the doctor’s oﬃce.509
Yet critics such as Public Citizen have regarded education and publicity as a the mere “Pavlovian response
to drug safety issues by manufacturers and the FDA.”510 Public Citizen’s suggestion that warnings have
been a mere automatic reaction to Accutane risks overlooks the thoughtful care and preparation devoted
to Accutane education campaigns.511 Nevertheless, commentators have raised legitimate concern about the
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51eﬃcacy of the Accutane warnings.512
Krause lauded FDA for the creativity of its post-marketing Accutane education eﬀorts, but criticized the
initially lax warnings accompanying the drug; the drugs failure to clearly indicate that it could caused
birth defects in human patients was troubling.513 In addition, Krause noted that literature based warnings
written only in English might have made it more diﬃcult for the illiterate and non-English speakers to access
information.514
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to successful warnings were mass media reports of the drug’s beneﬁts.
The portrayal of Accutane as a “miracle cure” probably increased consumer demand. By contrast, physicians,
rather than consumers, were the primary audience for many of the Accutane education eﬀorts. While Roche
engaged in a risk education campaign, it also ran advertisements touting the drug’s psychological beneﬁts
515 Krause suggests that more intense mass media campaigns should have publicized Accutane’s dangers.
At the 2000 Advisory Committee meeting, Dr. Peter Honig of FDA’s Oﬃce of Postmarketing Drug Risk
Assessment expressed FDA’s waning conﬁdence even in doctor-targeted warnings.516 Citing experiences with
other drugs such as Seldane, Dr. Honig argued that labeling changes and passive educational campaigns
have traditionally done relatively little to manage risk.517 He concluded, “I think it is clear that labeling
changes and Dear Doctor letters are relatively ineﬀective ways of communicating risk if your intention is
changing behavior”518
Dr Honig detailed obstacles to translating education into action.519 His study points to labeling fatigue—
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52the diﬃculty of changing behavior with numerous labeling revisions if the initial revisions are ineﬀective.520
Information overload and the law of diminishing returns works against behavior change in these cases.521
Citing research on clinical practice guidelines, Dr. Honig discussed factors limiting physicians’ adherence to
clinical practice guidelines.522 Unawareness of the guidelines, lack of familiarity with them, disagreement
with them and doubt that adherence will produce results can be major impediments to adherence.523 In
addition, “the inertia of previous practice” can contribute to the problem; as recommendations change
frequently adherents to the most recent advice dwindles.524
Finally, there are “external barriers” of inconvenience and confusion.525 These external barriers may only
worsen as managed care systems proliferate.526 Shorter patient visits and patient-doctor relationships hinder
education eﬀorts.527 Pregnancy prevention and psychiatric illness alike implicate sensitive personal issues
diﬃcult to discuss with strangers.528 Frequent doctor changes and briefer visits are not conducive to such
education eﬀorts.529
Thus, as problems with eﬀective education become apparent, emphasis on post-approval restrictions look
more appealing.
E. Post-Approval Controls
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53Post-approval controls may minimize the occurrence of adverse events. Yet these safety controls may also
carry the price of limited drug access.530 Indeed by making it more diﬃcult to obtain a drug, post-approval
controls may foster an unregulated underground market for the drug featuring little, if any, safety precautions
for drug users.531 Safety controls can also intrude on the autonomy and privacy of the patients themselves,
conditioning prescriptions on invasive requirements. The Accutane experience illustrates all of these concerns.
Some have proposed that Accutane should only be distributed from regional centers.532 Such a program
would mirror the British model of Accutane regulation under which Accutane may only be prescribed by a
select group of dermatologists.533 Patients are referred to one of these specialists by their own doctors and
must be warned of the risks of pregnancy, given a written warning, required to sign a consent form and to
agree to an immediate abortion if they become pregnant while taking the drug.534
Dr. Mary Spraker objected to this proposal citing concerns about inconvenience to the patient, increased cost
and a questionable reduction of actual pregnancy exposures.535 This “regional center” concept may make it
far more diﬃcult for patients outside of major cities to obtain the drug.536 Patients from rural areas may
have to travel miles for care.537 Even city residents could ﬁnd it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a registered pharmacy.538
The program imposes both physical and psychological barriers to Accutane use.539 By forcing a patient
to switch from an unregistered to an registered doctor, we disrupt a crucial doctor-patient relationship in
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54which the evaluation of a patient’s reliability and the necessity of discussing sensitive pregnancy prevention
issues are paramount concerns. Financial barriers may also rise.540 Dr. Spraker further argues that such
a regulatory system would increase the cost of the already expensive Accutane.541 The tightly monitored
anti-psychotic drug Clozapine has eﬀectively been rationed by the price increases under its mandatory mon-
itoring system.542
In addition, Dr. Spraker questioned the ultimate eﬃcacy of a “center use” approach.543 She noted that
despite receiving pregnancy counseling and receiving the drug from a limited center patients can still be-
come pregnant while using the drug.544 Dr. Barbara Reed likened conception while on Accutane to other
risk-taking behaviors such as reckless driving and doubted that any amount of monitoring and education
could “legislate pregnancy prevention.”545
Indeed, such a regulatory regime might spur unauthorized use of the drug, a phenomenon likely to produce
more, not less, pregnancy exposures.546 The regime might pressure people to engage in drug sharing.547 Al-
ternatively, those unable to obtain the drug legally may look to underground markets.548 Recently, Accutane
was found among several prescription drugs seized in a raid of Contra Costa, California supermarkets.549
The drugs, which appear to have been manufactured in Mexico, were sold over-the-counter to anyone with
the ability to pay.550 California oﬃcials suspect that the practice is widespread.551
The Internet may only exacerbate this problem. The Roaccutane Action Group has alleged that it has
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55already obtained Accutane by placing an online order for the drug under the names of teenagers.552 It
received the drug from South Africa within only 10 days of the request, accompanied by a prescription
from a doctor with a South African address.553 The Group paints a frightening portrait of Internet drug
marketing explaining, “all you need is a credit card. No medical consultation. No meeting between patient
and doctor. No blood tests. No birth control safeguards. No monitoring of patients.”554
F. Patient Autonomy
While concern about the underground drug market centers on its extreme lack of government regulation,
critics of post-marketing regulation worry about excessive government intrusions. Just as dermatologists
have called for physician autonomy, many participants in the Accutane debate have called for patients’
autonomy, particularly female patient’s autonomy.555
Concerns about fetal exposure are well justiﬁed. A fetus exposed to Accutane only 15 days after fertilization
may suﬀer from birth defects and many women are unaware of their pregnancies at this point. Eﬀectively
monitoring pregnancy status is thus particularly important during Accutane therapy. Indeed, some have
asked if a self-pregnancy test could accompany each daily dose of the drug to facilitate monitoring.556 (252).
In a similar vein, some have suggested that patients be required to prove that they use several forms of
contraception.557 Others advocate the mandatory use of injectable contraceptives.558
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56Among the most passionate advocates of pregnancy prevention measures are thalidomide victims.559 The
Thalidomide Victims Association of Canada testiﬁed at the 2000 Advisory Committee hearings in support
of pregnancy prevention measures.560 The group was formed in 1988 to support and empower Canadian
“thalidomiders”.561 In 1995, the Association became involved in the thalidomide licensing issue; it demanded
the implementation of a mandatory compliance program to minimize pregnancy exposures to thalidomide
used in women with severe illnesses.562 Thalidomide was licensed under the restrictive STEPS program which
requires a mandatory physician, patient and pharmacy registry.563 Only those registered may prescribe,
dispense or use the drug. Registry is prohibitively expensive and few if any doctors in private practice can
aﬀord those cost. In addition, relatively few patients have been registered.564
Since then the Thalidomide group has become involved in debates over the management of many teratogenic
drugs.565 It is determined “to remind those making these decisions [as to the risks and beneﬁts of Accutane]
that the risks can always be lessened by responsible thinking...If mandatory compliance lessens pain for
just one family, creating one less victim, it is worth it. No amount of compensation can amount to a healthy
body.”566
Accutane’s use in teenagers makes the risk of pregnancy exposure more troubling.567 Teenagers often fail
to report their sexual activity and are especially unlikely to use birth control.568 As Dr. Amarilyas Vega
noted, “We know that sexual activity status from not being sexually active to becoming sexually active
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57may change overnight.”569 This is particularly true for adolescents.570 They often report that they fail to
use birth control because they do not expect to have intercourse.571 Despite reporting abstinence to their
dermatologists, they may unwittingly expose their unborn child to Accutane.572 As the Thalidomide Victims
Association reminds, the consequences of such exposures could be devastating.573
However, the competing interest in patient autonomy counsels against restrictive drug regulatory regimes.
Dr. Michael Greene expressed alarm at some of the pregnancy prevention programs contemplated by fellow
participants in the 2000 hearings.574 For him, many of these schemes would intrude too deeply on women’s
autonomy.575 He explained:
If a woman is fully informed – I’m not talking about a child or a minor, but if a fully informed
woman says that she is abstinent and says that, recognizing everything that we’ve had to say about
the risks associated with taking Accutane that she doesn’t need and doesn’t want contraception, I
would have a tough time telling that adult woman that she can’t make that decision for herself, as
an obstetrician/gynecologist. So I view with a little bit of alarm some of what I consider to be rather
draconian proposals that would ride roughshod over an adult, competent woman’s autonomy.576
Dr. Barbara Reed, a dermatologist who initially spent 12 years practicing gynecology, opposed mandatory
registration of Accutane patients for similar reasons.577 She suggests the dangers of a slippery slope that
would increasingly limit women’s freedom in the name of the unborn.578 For her, Accutane use implicates
the same issues involved in fetal alcohol syndrome and other diseases related to a pregnant women’s risky
behavior.579 Reed asks, “Are we going to have a registry for buyers and sellers of non-steroidal anti-
inﬂammatory drugs and alcohol. Cigarettes is another one.”580
569See 2000 Pregnancy Prevention hearings, supra note 1, 51 (statement of Dr. Amarlyas Vega)
570See id.
571See id.
572See id.
573See 2000 Pregnancy Prevention Hearings, supra note 1, at 206 (statement of Randall Warren).
574See 2000 Pregnancy Prevention Hearings, supra note 1, (statement of Dr. Michael Greene)
575See id.
577See id., at 179 (statement of Dr. Barbara Reed)
578See id.
579See id.
580See id.
58These concerns are not new. At the 1991 Advisory Committee hearings, Dr. Mary Spraker, a practicing
academic pediatric dermatologist, rejected proposals that every patient take an oral, injectable or implant
able contraceptive, despite the patient’s commitment to abstinence or the continued use of her current
contraception device.581 Dr. Spraker insisted that the patient should possess the ultimate power to make
contraceptive decisions; she argued that doctors should respect a patient’s unwillingness to undertake the
risks of contraceptive use, to experience invasive device placement procedures or to incur the expense of
implant able contraceptives.582 She argued, “ The patients, once given the alternatives with the prospective
pros and cons, has the right to participate in the choice of her own contraceptive.583 We need to recognize
that as physicians we can guide our patients, but we do not have, and do not want, the power to control
them.”584
Perhaps most invasive are requirements found in some European countries, such as Britain, mandating
that female Accutane patients agree to abort any pregnancy that occurs while taking the drug.585 Such a
proposal in U.S. drug regulation would directly engage the controversial abortion issue. Roche’s pregnancy
counseling program includes discussion of emergency contraception and the ‘morning-after pill,’ and at least
some commentators have argued that Roche should pay for the therapeutic abortions often elected by women
whose children have been exposed to the drug.586
G. System to Manage Accutane Related Teratogenicity (S.M.A.R.T.)
FDA announced its new S.M.A.R.T program amidst this debate.587 The program reﬂects FDA’s growing
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59commitment to more active post-marketing regulation. Yet it also illustrates continued respect for both
patient and doctor autonomy. While S.M.A.R.T. includes unusually restrictive post-approval drug regulation,
it does not go as far in monitoring and limiting Accutane use as many advocates for Accutane controls would
have liked.588 Indeed S.M.A.R.T. is not as dramatic a departure from the traditional focus of Accutane
regulation on warnings and education, rather than distribution limitations.
S.M.A.R.T. exempliﬁes the kind of active post-marketing regulation contemplated by the Task Force. Rather
than merely recommending that doctors test female patients for pregnancy, the program requires that two
pregnancy tests be performed both prior to commencing therapy and each month thereafter throughout the
course of the therapy.589 Prescribers sign a “Letter of Understanding” promising to perform these tests.
The program similarly requires the choice of two forms of birth control, unless absolute abstinence will be
practiced during therapy and for one month after its completion, or the patient has had a hysterectomy.590
Placement of the Accutane Qualiﬁcation sticker on the doctor’s prescription form certiﬁes compliance with
the safeguards.591 These measures are unusually speciﬁc and mandatory. In addition, signing and returning
the form essentially registers the doctor to prescribe the drug.592 In addition patients are required to sign
and return an informed consent form which eﬀectively registers them as well.593
Also unusual is S.M.A.R.T.’s prohibition of pharmacy distribution of Accutane to those without an Accu-
tane Qualiﬁcation sticker.594 Roche had questioned the wisdom of placing pharmacists in an essentially
regulatory role with regard to doctors and argued that such a role extends beyond pharmacy practice guide-
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60lines by intruding too extensively on the practice of medicine.595 Yet S.M.A.R.T. forbids pharmacists from
ﬁlling prescriptions lacking the sticker.596 It also requires them to ﬁll prescriptions within seven days of the
prescription’s date and to distribute a large medication guide with the drug.597 One pharmacist has called
the measures “extraordinary...almost a matter of overkill.”598
These limitations fall squarely within the post-approval controls suggested by the Task Force on Risk Man-
agement.599 The Report explicitly suggested the imposition of safety programs for risky products. 600 It
noted increasing acceptance by the medical profession’s acceptance of post-marketing regulation of such
programs.601 Press reports on S.M.A.R.T. label it “unusually strict” and note its departure from traditional
reliance solely on medical professionals to informally implement pregnancy prevention standards.602
Nevertheless, Public Citizen argues that S.M.A.R.T. is not enough of a departure from tradition.603 Dr.
Sidney Wolf continues to call for limitation of Accutane prescribing to select specialists. He remains con-
cerned about possible over-prescription of the drug and views the limitation on prescribers as the best means
of combating the problem.604 S.M.A.R.T., however, is more protective of preserving access to the drug. It
is also more protective of women’s autonomy than other proposals for more restrictive regimes. Unlike pro-
posals ventured at Advisory Committee Hearings, the program also permits those who promise to practice
absolute abstinence to forgo birth control while taking the drug.605 In addition, the Continuing Medical
Education course that Roche has developed for physicians remains optional.606 The program certainly does
not mandate the termination of pregnancies conceived during therapy.607
595See 2000 Pregnancy Prevention Hearings, supra note 1, at 153.
596See FDA Press Oﬃce, supra note 266, at 2.
597See Knich, supra note 402.
598See id.
599See Report, supra note 41, at 92-94
600See id..
601See id., at 92.
602See Knich, supra note 402.
603See id.
604See id.
605See id.
606See FDA Press Oﬃce, supra note 266, at 2.
607See id.
61Although the program is easily categorized as a form of “risk intervention” in the language of the Task
Force’s Report, its primary means of eﬀecting change may occur through its risk communication aspects.
The required consent forms, and Letters of Understanding and Medication Guides contain substantive infor-
mation on risks.608 Yet, in themselves, the very hurdles doctors and patients must clear in order to obtain
the drug signals the perceived importance of the risks at stake. Regardless of the content of the warnings,
these obstacles alone communicate FDA’s concerns about pregnancy prevention. Thus it may have a cau-
tionary eﬀect on both prescribers contemplating the appropriateness of Accutane therapy for their patients
and on patients engaging in a pregnancy prevention strategy. The program mandates certain behavior—the
frequent pregnancy tests and use of birth control in sexually active women—but it has a large educational
component as well.609 Thus it follows in the tradition of the risk communication emphasis in Accutane
regulation.
Yet according to Jonathan Wilkin, director of FDA’s Division of Dermatologic and Dental Drug Products
Division, FDA is prepared to impose even stricter regulation if S.M.A.R.T. fails to reduce Accutane –related
birth defects.610 Thus S.M.A.R.T. may be just the beginning both of Accutane’s post-marketing controls
and of post-marketing regulation more broadly in American drug policy making.
V. Conclusion
Accutane exempliﬁes the central conﬂict in drug regulation between ensuring drug safety and maximizing
drug availability. The Acutance experience reﬂects a growing trend towards recognizing the need for stronger
post-marketing drug regulation in striking the correct balance between these goals. S.M.A.R.T. takes a
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62dramatic step towards implementing the risk management suggestions of the Task Force on Risk Management
in the ﬁght to protect patients from Accutane’s teratogenic risks and alleged psychiatric consequences. Yet,
perhaps wisely, it does not impose as intrusive a regulatory regime as possible thereby preserving as much
patient and physician independence as possible in combating a potentially serious illness.
63